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ARGUMENT. 
LARSON FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT TOLLING PROVISIONS 
SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND IS NOT 
A CLOAK TO AVOID JUSTICE. 
Larson suggests in his brief that somehow it would be he who would be 
m-mn<Jiced jcpcnuiHL. outcome o> ,,.-, i uuri s 
Larson suggests that finding in fa\ :» of Olsel h "1 1 :t ; it 1 he ste i;l I il e of 
limitations should have been t o l l c ng the pendency of litigation" will deprive 
him of due process, of "fair play and sub-
 :] justice." Appellee's Br. p. 8. 
v\ nereas, u is UK, i '.uiii. >. \l> • • mat behe\ e^ she would be deprived of 
^•i!^' <^i*'<] - -•• - _ . ia. . t!u v t some 
equitable suspension period. Larson nrr. * ! has 
utterly failed to show any reason why Larson could not be served within the four-
year limitation period, and he should not be prejudiced by Olseth 's dilatory 
attempts, or lack thereof, to serve h im \\ uh process " - 1/ ; oellee '$ Br, p. 16. 
The record shows that Olseth did personally servo 1 at*M )v I "' <i"f »i i 11< i 
that first action (case no. 2:00-cv-0402) was dismissed and then refiled on October 
11, 2002, (case no, 2:02-cv-l 1221 unbeknownst to her, Mr. Larson was not to be 
found, in Utah. 
themselves subject to enlargement by State Law. Both Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
35 and 78-12-40 are State provisions that protect plaintiffs from a defendant's 
subsequent statute of limitations claim. Both provisions are Legislative 
codifications of equitable tolling principles. These principles are valid under the 
law and still recognized by the Courts, including the Tenth Circuit. "Equitable 
tolling" of a statute means only that the running of the statute is suspended, not 
that the limitations period begins over again. See Benge v. United States. 17 F.3d 
1286 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Irwin v. Veterans Admin. 498 U.S. 89, 94-96, 111 
S. Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 1. Ed. 2d 435 (1990); Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv.. 
951 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Larson claims on appeal that he was amenable to service, no such record 
reference to evidence supports that assertion. That same uncorroborated hearsay 
was asserted in the trial court too. The trial court's acceptance of that argument 
without corroborating sworn statements or other documentary evidence is mere 
rumor and does not constitute substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) ("Mere uncorroborated hearsay 
or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.") But, in this matter, the 
Plaintiffs suit against Larson is entitled to some form of "equitable tolling" there 
exists ample citations to the record evidence supporting the preservation of the 
2 
suit. Here, Olseth had Larson personally served on 6-27-2000. Return of 
Summons-Aplt. App. 140-142; Reply Add. 1-3 (attached) There were two 
Matthew D. Larsons employed at the Salt Lake City Police Department as police 
officers (one spelling his name "Larsen" and one spelling his name "Larson"). 
That fact was not made known to Olseth; however, the correct Larson was actually 
served. That fact is not disputed. The first action was dismissed on May 15, 2002, 
but was re-filed on October 11, 2002. That fact is not disputed. From June 27, 
2000 (the date of service) to May 15, 2002, (the date of dismissal), a total of 22.5 
months, or 687 days, or one-year-10 months-13 days before the run of the four-
year-statute of limitations would have occurred. 
In addition to these facts, the other undisputed facts are that Plaintiff 
attempted to have Larson's counsel (through the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office) 
accept service on Larson's behalf in the second suit, since he was represented by 
staff counsel previously. Service by Wesley Robinson was refused claiming that 
he did not represent Larson and Larson had not conveyed authority to him to 
accept on his behalf. Given the fact that the first service on June 27, 2000 was a 
requirement imposed by Larson's counsel previously, the change of heart is 
intolerable and constitutes just cause alone for the enlargement of time. 
Meanwhile, Larson accuses Olseth of acting dilatory insinuating she 
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delayed without "excuse." Excusable neglect has been approved as "good cause." 
Clearly the facts described above constitute "good cause." Failure to timely serve 
may be "neglect," the pivotal question then for this Court to decide is whether the 
explanation and circumstances described by Olseth is "excusable neglect." The 
trial court did not inquiry, limiting itself to the omission alone. This Court 
therefore, can find that the limitation was an abuse of discretion, because the 
controlling authority is from the United States Supreme - which is binding upon 
this Court and the Tenth Circuit as well as the U.S. District Court. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that "excusable neglect" 
is a "somewhat elastic concept," not limited exclusively to omissions caused by 
circumstances outside the moving party's control, but which must be assessed in 
view of all relevant circumstances surrounding the omission. Pioneer Inv. Serves. 
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship. 507 U.S. 380, 390-95, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 
1496-98, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993) (construing excusable neglect in context of 
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), which was patterned after Rule 6(b)). Reviewing this 
case in the fashion required in Pioneer, it is clear that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the excusable neglect exists and because there is good cause, she is 
eligible for equitable tolling. In this matter, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 remain on the books, the case 
history, the fact that Larson had previously been served, followed by Salt Lake 
City Attorney staff counsel first required personal service and then later refused to 
act as Larson's counsel for the purpose of service of process, all justifies the 
suspension of the statute of limitations. Both Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 and 78-
12-35 and the United States Supreme Court's Pioneer Inv. Serves. Co. v. 
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship. 507 U.S. 380, 390-95, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1496-98, 
123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993), all require that Utah's borrowed four-year-statute of 
limitations period borrowed in this matter be tolled. In this matter, Olseth believes 
that the certified question to this Court requires this Court to provide a date certain 
computation of a suspension, and is not limited to just an affirmative or negative 
response. In this matter, Olseth suggests that the Court inform Tenth Circuit that a 
period of "one-year-10 months-13 days" suspension is deserved. 
CONCLUSION, 
Having replied to Larson's Brief, Olseth hereby respectfully requests this 
Court to issue a Memorandum Decision in this matter in her favor suspending the 
Statute of Limitations for "one-year-10 months-13 days/' The Defendant Larson 
is not entitled to nullify either Sections 78-12-35 or 78-12-40 from Utah Law. 
Unless this Court sua sponte moves to find both statutes unconstitutional (which it 
is believed the Court is not inclined to do so), the Court cannot because neither 
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party has so moved for an unconstitutional declaration. Also, so long as the 
statutes remain unrepealed by the Utah Legislature, the Court is absolutely 
required to apply them in this case by their plain language. Section 78-12-40 
permits the one-year suspension of the statute of limitations if the former action 
was dismissed not on their merits, and Section 78-12-35 permits the suspension of 
the limitations period during the resident defendants5 absence from the State. 
Olseth does make a suggestion however to avoid the scenario suggested by 
Larson on page 10 of his Brief: 
To construe Utah's tolling statute in the manner urged by Olseth would 
allow lawsuits to be tolled indefinitely . . . . 
Appellee ys Br. p. 10. Olseth does not urge this Court to make that decision. 
Instead, Olseth suggests that it should be limited to the same as the discovery rule 
- another equitable tolling provision. Once, a plaintiff discovers the defendant no 
longer resides in the State of Utah, of the original statute of limitations has 
expired, the plaintiff should have only one year from the discovery of the change 
of out-of-state residency. Once it becomes known to a plaintiff that the defendant 
is not a resident of another state is when the long-arm statute begins its application 
upon the defendant. Having had his former residence in Utah, the defendant is 
hard-pressed to show no minimal contacts remain with Utah, even though he 
abandoned his citizenship. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of July, 2006. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Bertina Rae "Tina" Olseth 
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Reply Brief Addendum 
j '"1 za 
0 AAC] (Rev. 10/S3) Summons in a Civil Action 
211629 DISTRICT OF 
y^ 
M 
^Lnitzb £&tatB& ^ t s t r t c t (Unurt c.yy 
BERTINA RAE OLSETH, individual 
V. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICERS MATTHEW D. LARSEN, MARK 
SCHUMAN, DET. GUY YOSHIKAWA AND 
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 
Governmental Agencies and individuals, 
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL CASE 
CASE NUMBER: 2:OOCV-0402 c 
T O ; (Name and address of defendant) 
OFFICER MATTHEW D. LARSEN c/o SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
315 East 200 South/ Salt Lake City", Utah 84111; 801.799.3000 
I f f - 3/Oy 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon PONTIFFS ATTORNEY (name and address) 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Attn: D. Bruce Oliver 
an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) <jayS after service of 
this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for 
the relief demanded in the complaint. You must also file your answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of 
time after service. 
UPON 
SIN, 
'- BOUNTY, UTAH 
_DEPUTY 
CLERK DATE 
(rr\ct-^fs 
^ Wf^P Re/*L.y Add, I 
2,11629 
OLI8888 
Constable's Office 
47 E 7200 S, Suite 
Midvale, Utah 840<,. 
Phone # (801) 561-4278 
Constable's Proof of Service 
OLSETH, BERTINA RAE 
Vs. 
LARSEN, MATTHEW D 
Plaintiffs) 
200CV-0402C 
Defendant(s) 
Process: SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
THE UNDERSIGNED PERSON HEREBY CERTIFIES: 
1) I served the attached process in the manner indicated below. 
2) I was at the time of service a duly qualified and acting peace officer or person over the age of 18 
•years. 
3) I am not a party to this action. 
4) I endorsed the date of service, my name and my official title, if any, on each copy served. 
I served: Larsen, Matthew D 
Date Served: 6/28/2000 953 
Address Of Service: 315 E 200 S, Salt Lake City 
Personally, by serving the above named individual(s), Larsen, Matthew D, in person. 
SERVICE FEE: $6.00 
MILEAGE FEE: $4.00 
Additional Trips $8.00 
TOTAL: $18.00 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
180 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Ut 841011218 
By: Doug Lamping 
Deputy/Server #367 
Docket: 211629 
APP. 000141 
D H N A. 'S I 'NDT C O N S T ' ^ L E ' S OFFICE j 
IGAST72W SOUTH SUITE 221 SALT LAKE COUNTY ! 
©VALE, UTAH 84047 PHONE (801) 561-4278 ; 
•ORNEY:
 D> Bruce Oliver \ 
i 
LLTO: ; 
180 South 300 West I 
Salt Lake City Ut 841011218 j 
OLSETH, BERTINA RAE 
VS. j . ' i 
Larsen, Matthew D 
i i 
Summons & Complaint ! $10.00 j 
Additional Trips • $8.00j 
Received On Account: ! $0.001 
Balance: I _ $18.00 j 
| i 
I 
i i 
; | 
: i 
i 
, i 
PLEASE LIST INVOICE NO.' WITH YOUR PAYMENT. 
